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I
n 2002, average unemployment in
Europe was relatively high
compared with OECD countries
outside Europe. Yet the majority of
countries in Europe in 2002 had
lower unemployment than any OECD
country outside Europe, including the
United States. These two facts are
consistent because the four largest countries
in continental Western Europe – namely,
France, Germany, Italy and Spain – have very
high unemployment and most of the rest
have comparatively low unemployment.
This variability is highly informative
because despite ‘free’ movement of labour,
European countries have more or less
independent labour markets in practice.
Using this information, we see how changes
in the structure of the various labour
markets explain a substantial proportion of
the secular fluctuations in unemployment in
the various countries.
In particular, we can pin down some of
the particular factors that enable us to
understand why some European countries
have been able fully to recover from the
unemployment disasters of the early 1980s
whereas some have not.
Changing labour market
institutions
Table 1 presents a picture of





Europe’s successes and failures
Why has unemployment fallen in some
European countries but not in others? 
To answer this question, Richard Layard,
Stephen Nickell and Richard Jackman revisit
their landmark analysis of macroeconomic
performance and the labour market.
1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-99 2000-1 2002
Australia 2.5 1.9 4.6 7.7 8.7 7.9 6.5 6.3
Austria 1.6 1.4 1.4 3.1 3.6 4.3 3.7 4.3
Belgium 2.3 2.3 5.8 11.2 8.4 9.2 6.8 7.3
Canada 5.5 4.7 6.9 9.7 9.5 8.7 7.0 7.7
Denmark 2.2 1.7 4.1 7.0 8.1 5.3 4.4 4.5
Finland 1.4 2.4 4.1 5.1 9.9 12.2 9.4 9.1
France 1.5 2.3 4.3 8.9 10.5 11.5 9.0 8.7
Germany (W) 0.8 0.8 2.9 6.1 5.6 7.4 6.4 6.8
Ireland 5.1 5.3 7.3 13.8 14.7 8.7 4.0 4.4
Italy 3.5 4.2 4.5 6.7 8.1 9.9 8.4 7.4
Japan 1.4 1.3 1.8 2.5 2.5 3.9 4.9 5.4
Netherlands 0.9 1.7 4.7 10.0 7.2 4.5 2.6 2.8
Norway 2.2 1.7 1.8 2.4 5.2 3.8 3.6 3.9
New Zealand 0.0 0.3 0.7 4.7 8.1 6.8 5.7 5.2
Portugal 2.3 2.5 5.5 7.8 5.4 6.0 4.1 5.1
Spain 2.4 2.7 4.9 17.6 19.6 19.4 13.5 11.4
Sweden 1.2 1.6 1.6 2.3 5.1 8.6 5.5 4.9
Switzerland 0.2 0.0 0.8 1.8 2.8 3.5 2.6 2.6
UK 2.6 3.1 4.8 10.5 8.8 6.8 5.2 5.1
United States 5.5 4.3 6.4 7.6 6.1 4.8 4.4 5.8
Table 1
Unemployment (standardised percentage rate) 1960s. Our analysis suggests that a large
part of the dramatic rise in unemployment
in the big continental European countries
over this period can be explained by
changes in the key labour market
institutions – changes in unemployment
benefit systems, increases in labour taxes,
increased power of trade unions and
changes in employment protection law.
It is widely accepted that labour
market rigidities are an important part of
the explanation for the high levels of
unemployment that are still to be found in
a number of OECD countries. But
acceptance is not universal. One often
cited argument is that labour market
rigidities cannot explain why European
unemployment is so much higher than US
unemployment because the institutions
generating these rigidities were much the
same in the 1960s as they are today and
in the 1960s, unemployment was much
higher in the United States than in Europe.
What are the facts? It is indeed correct
that US unemployment was much higher
than European unemployment in the
1960s, but as we have seen, the picture
today is less clear-cut than is commonly
thought. And what of the argument that
the European institutions generating
labour market rigidities have been more or
less unchanged since the 1960s? In fact,
the evidence makes clear that this is
simply not true.
Unemployment benefits
There are four aspects of the
unemployment benefit system for which
there are good theoretical and empirical
reasons to believe that they will influence
the long-run, equilibrium, level of
unemployment: the level of benefits; the
duration of entitlement; the coverage of
the system; and the strictness with which
the system is operated.
Of these, data are only available for
the first two for the OECD countries. The
OECD has collected systematic data on the
unemployment benefit replacement ratio
for three different family types – single,
with dependent spouse and with spouse
at work – in three different duration
categories from 1961 to 1999.
The key feature of these data is that in
nearly all countries, benefit replacement
ratios tended to become more generous
from the 1960s to the late 1970s, the
exceptions being Germany, Japan and
New Zealand. Italy had no effective benefit
system over this period for the vast
majority of the unemployed.
After the late 1970s, countries moved
in different directions. Italy introduced a
benefit system and those in Finland,
Portugal and Switzerland became
markedly more generous. By contrast,
benefit replacement ratios in Belgium,
Ireland and the UK have fallen steadily
since the late 1970s or early 1980s.
It is unfortunate that we have no
comprehensive data on the coverage of
the system or on the strictness with which
it is administered. This is particularly true
in the case of the latter because the
evidence we possess appears to indicate
that this is of crucial importance in
determining the extent to which a
generous level of benefit will actually
influence unemployment.
For example, Denmark, which has very
generous unemployment benefits, totally
reformed the operation of its benefit
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1960-64 1965-72 1973-79 1980-87 1988-95 1996-98 Extension laws 
in place
Australia 48 45 49 49 43 35  
Austria 59 57 52 51 45 39  
Belgium 40 42 52 52 52 -  
Canada 27 29 35 37 36 36 ✕
Denmark 60 61 71 79 76 76  ✕
Finland 35 47 66 69 76 80  
France 20 21 21 16 10 10  
Germany (W) 34 32 35 34 31 27  
Ireland 47 51 56 56 51 43 ✕
Italy 32 48 45 40 37   
Japan 33 33 30 27 24 22 ✕
Netherlands 41 38 37 30 24 24  
Norway 52 51 52 55 56 55 ✕
New Zealand 36 35 38 37 35 21 ✕
Portugal 61 61 61 57 34  
Spain 9 9 9 11 16 18  
Sweden 64 66 76 83 84 87 ✕
Switzerland 35 32 32 29 23   
UK 44 47 55 53 42 35 X
United States 27 26 20 16 14 X
Table 2
Union density (union members as a percentage of employees)









system through the 1990s with a view to
tightening the criteria for benefit receipt
and the enforcement of these criteria via a
comprehensive system of sanctions. The
Danish Ministry of Labour is convinced that
this process has played a major role in
allowing Danish unemployment to fall
dramatically since the early 1990s without
generating inflationary pressure. 
A further aspect of the structure of the
benefit system for which we do not have
detailed data back to the 1960s are those
policies grouped under the heading of
active labour market policies (ALMPs), the
purpose of which is to provide active
assistance to the unemployed that will
improve their chances of obtaining work.
We do, however, have data from 1985,
which shows that, by and large, the
countries of Northern Europe and
Scandinavia devote most resources to
ALMPs. It might be hypothesised that they
do this because high expenditure on ALMPs
is required to offset their rather generous
unemployment benefit systems and to push
unemployed individuals into work. Such
additional pressure on the unemployed is
less important if benefits are very low
relative to potential earnings in work.
Systems of wage
determination
In most countries in the OECD, the
majority of workers have their wages set
by collective bargaining between
employers and trade unions at the plant,
firm, industry or aggregate level. The
available data on collective bargaining
coverage – the proportion of employees
covered by collective agreements – show
that across most of continental Europe,
including Scandinavia but excluding
Switzerland, coverage is both high and
stable. This is either because most people
belong to trade unions or because union
agreements are extended by law to cover
non-members in the same sector.
In Switzerland and the OECD countries
outside continental Europe and Scandinavia,
coverage is generally much lower, with the
exception of Australia. In New Zealand, the
UK and the United States, coverage has
declined with the fall in union density, there
being no extension laws.
Table 2 shows the percentage of
employees who are union members.
Across most of Scandinavia, membership
tends to be high. By contrast, in much of
continental Europe and in Australia, union
density tends to be less than 50% and is
gradually declining. In these countries,
there is, consequently, a wide and
widening gap between density and
coverage, which it is the job of the
extension laws to fill. This situation is at its
most stark in France, which has the lowest
union density in the OECD at around
10%, but one of the highest levels of
coverage at around 95%.
Outside these regions, both density
and coverage tend to be relatively low and
both are declining at greater or lesser
rates. The absence of complete coverage
data means that we have to use density
measures to capture the impact of
unionisation on unemployment. As should
be clear, this is only half the story, so we
must treat any results we find in this area
with some caution. 
The other aspect of wage bargaining
that appears to have a significant impact
on wages and unemployment is the
extent to which bargaining is co-
ordinated. Co-ordination refers to
mechanisms whereby the aggregate
employment implications of wage
determination are taken into account
when wage bargains are struck.
This may be achieved if wage
bargaining is highly centralised, as in
Austria, or if there are institutions, such as
employers’ federations, which can assist
bargainers to act in concert even when
bargaining itself ostensibly occurs at the
level of the firm or industry, as in
Germany or Japan. It is worth noting that
co-ordination is not, therefore, the same
as centralisation, which refers simply to
the level at which bargaining takes place:
plant, firm, industry or economy-wide.
Notable changes in co-ordination
since the 1960s are the increases in
Ireland and the Netherlands towards the
end of the period and the declines in
Australia, New Zealand and Sweden. Co-
ordination also declined in the UK over
the same period but this simply reflects
the sharp decline of unionism overall.
Employment protection
Employment protection laws may tend to
make firms more cautious about filling
vacancies, which slows the speed at
which the unemployed move into work.
But the mechanism here is not clear-cut.
For example, the introduction of
employment protection laws often leads
to an increased professionalisation of the
personnel function within firms, as was
the case in the UK in the 1970s. This can
increase the efficiency of job matching.
So in terms of outflows from
unemployment, the impact of
employment protection laws can go either
way. By contrast, such laws will clearly
reduce involuntary separations and hence
lower inflows into unemployment. So the
overall impact on unemployment is an
empirical question. Furthermore,
employment law may also have a direct
impact on pay since it raises the job
security of existing employees,
encouraging them to demand higher 
pay increases.
Labour taxes
The important taxes here are those that
form part of the wedge between the real
product wage (labour costs per employee
normalised on the output price) and the
real consumption wage (after tax pay
normalised on the consumer price index).
These are payroll taxes, income taxes and
consumption taxes. Their combined
impact on unemployment remains a
subject of some debate despite the large
number of empirical investigations. 
All countries exhibit a substantial
increase in the total tax rate on labour
over the period from the 1960s to the
1990s although there are wide variations
across countries. These mainly reflect theextent to which health, higher education
and pensions are publicly provided along
with the all-round generosity of the social
security system. Some countries have
made significant attempts to reduce
labour taxes in recent years, notably the
Netherlands and the UK.
Labour market institutions
and the successes and
failures of the 1990s
Having looked at some of the key factors
that the evidence suggests have some
impact on equilibrium unemployment, let
us see how changes in these variables over
the last two decades can contribute to our
understanding of unemployment changes
over the same period.
Table 3 provides a picture of changes
in the relevant variables with a tick
referring to a significant move that will
tend to reduce unemployment and a cross
for the reverse. Double ticks and crosses
reflect really big moves. A dash implies no
significant change. Of course, this is a
pretty crude business and a proper panel
data analysis is arguably preferable. But
here we are able to take account of
variables where we are unable to obtain
long time series data.
So we can ask the question: do the
ticks and crosses bear any relationship to
the unemployment changes reported in
the final columns of the table? Our
analysis indicates that the number of 
ticks and crosses explains about half the
cross-country variation in unemployment
changes from the early 1980s to the
present. We may reasonably 
conclude that the countries that had 
very high unemployment in the early
1980s and still have high unemployment
today simply have too few ticks and/or 
too many crosses.
Four strategies for tackling
unemployment
The experience of the last 15 years shows
that given sensible macroeconomic
policies, it is possible to ensure that
unemployment remains fairly close to the
full employment level. Four strategies seem
particularly relevant.
  To prevent people drifting into long-term
unemployment, there should be active
policies to ensure that everyone gets
offers of work or training within a year
of becoming unemployed. The work
should where possible be with regular
employers, and secured if necessary by a
recruitment subsidy. A modernised
Public Employment Service is a key
instrument in the business of
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Replacement Benefit  Benefit  ALMP Union Union  Co-ordination
rate duration strictness coverage density
Europe
Austria ✕ ----  ✕
Belgium   ----- ✕
Denmark - ✕      -- ✕
Finland ✕ ---- ✕ 
France - ✕ -  ✕ - ✕
Germany (W) - ✕ -   -- -
Ireland  ✕ --?   
Italy ✕ -----  
Netherlands - -    --  
Norway ✕✕   -- ✕
Portugal ✕✕ -   -    -
Spain   --- ✕ --
Sweden ✕ ----- ✕
Switzerland ✕✕ ✕ -   -- ✕
UK  ✕ ✕      -
Non-Europe
Australia - -    -  ✕
Canada  ✕ ---- -
Japan ✕ ----- -
New Zealand - - - ✕      ✕ ✕
United States - -   --- -
Table 3
‘Policy’ changes from the early 1980s to the late 1990s
Active labour market
policies are needed to
prevent people drifting into
long-term unemployment channelling job offers to workers. It
should be properly staffed and funded,
with private agencies free to compete
with it.
  The welfare-to-work approach will not
prevent long-term unemployment if
individuals who receive offers from
employers can instead choose to
continue living on benefit. A system of
complementary rights and responsibilities
is needed where the citizen can expect
high-quality help in finding work, but in
return must take advantage of it or cease
to draw benefits. Provided the state is
channelling offers of work or work-
related activity to everyone within the
first year of unemployment, that should
be the maximum period for which
benefits are paid to people who are not
working or engaged in some work-
related activity.
  Further policies are needed to deal with
regional unemployment. In particular,
the decentralisation of wage setting and
measures aimed at improving the
external environment where firms
operate (for example, the efficiency of
public administration, the enforcement
of the rule of law, etc.) are also
essential. The decentralisation of
collective bargaining can be
accompanied with measures
encouraging regional labour mobility
and encouraging take-up of relatively
low-paid jobs, for example, by providing
in-work benefits to low-wage earners.
  Labour supply reducing policies such as
early retirement, as well as uncontrolled
access to invalidity pensions, should be
phased out as the welfare-to-work
approach makes it possible to deal with
redundancies without having to
implement (high cost) early retirement
for older workers. Reforms of pension
systems should also remove from public
pension arrangements those features
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Employment Labour Total Unemployment Unemployment
protection taxes  ✕ 1980-87 2000-1 change
Europe
Austria - ✕ 1 3 3.1 3.7 0.6
Belgium   - 2 1 11.2 6.8 -4.4
Denmark   - 4 2 7.0 4.4 -2.6
Finland   - 2 2 5.1 9.4 4.3
France ✕ - 1 4 8.9 9.0 0.1
Germany (W)   - 2 1 6.1 6.4 0.3
Ireland -   4 1 13.8 4.0 -9.8
Italy  ✕ 2 2 6.7 8.4 1.7
Netherlands    5 0 10.0 2.6 -7.4
Norway   - 3 3 2.4 3.6 1.2
Portugal   - 4 2 7.8 4.1 -3.7
Spain   - 2 1 17.6 13.5 -4.1
Sweden   - 1 2 2.3 5.5 3.2
Switzerland - - 1 4 1.8 2.6 0.8
UK -   6 2 10.5 5.2 -5.3
Non-Europe
Australia - ? 3 1 7.7 6.5 -1.2
Canada - X 1 2 9.7 7.0 -2.7
Japan - - 0 1 2.5 4.9 2.4
New Zealand - ? 3 3 4.7 5.7 1.0
United States - - 1 0 7.6 4.4 -3.2
Table 3
– cont’d
There should be a
maximum period for
which benefits are
paid to people who
are not working